Questões de Inglês - FGV | Gabarito e resoluções

(FGV - 2018/1) GAMETES By Kristin A. Hook [1] Most sexual organisms be they bacteria, fungi, plants, or animals have only two mating types: females and males. Females are defined by their ability to produce eggs, males by their ability to produce sperm. In distinguishing between those two types of gametes, size matters most. The union of a sperm, the small gamete, with an egg, the large gamete, characterizes sexual reproduction. But how did these two gamete types come to be? [2]One theory suggests that before females or males existed, all gametes were the same type and size. What size? A larger gamete offers more nutrition to a developing offspring [prole], assuring a higher chance of survival. Natural selection would thus favor all gametes to be large. But this is not what happened. [3] Efficiency also pays off in the gamete world. Large gametes are less efficient at finding a mate precisely because their size obliges them to be fewer in number. On the other hand, the smaller gametes invest their resources into being more abundant. Occurring in greater numbers means they are much more likely to encounter their target. [4] Clearly, there are advantages for both large and small gametes. To reconcile how we ended up with both types, lets imagine the potential pairings of these different gamete types from the perspective of natural selection. In a remarkable achievement, suppose two large gametes find one another. Sure, the fusion of their genetic material will result in a mighty super-survivor offspring because of their investments being large, equal, and nutritious. Unfortunately for them, however, their big investments will come at the expense of being rare, so these unions will result in fewer offspring. Likewise, though the union of two small gametes would be more probable given their abundance, neither gamete can provide sufficient nutrition for the offspring to survive. Consequently, neither of these unions between like gametes would be favored over time. [5] Because of this disparity in size, sexual evolution also involves a story of parasitism. Heres how it works: by favoring both egg and sperm, natural selection ensured unequal contributions from the gametes to the offspring. While large gametes evolved for nourishment of the offspring, small gametes became lazy, so to speak, since they didnt have to provide any of the nourishment for the offspring. Just like a parasite, a sperm cell will exploit the resources of an egg. Adapted fromNatural History,November 2014. With respect to the hypothetical union of two small gametes (as presented in paragraph 4), which of the following isnotmentioned?

(FGV-SP - 2017) Patience is needed for Brazil to come good again Michael Hasenstab Dr. Michael Hasenstab is executivevice-president, portfolio managerand chief investment officer ofTempleton Global Macro The Olympic Games in Rio drew global interest to Brazil, but the country and the rest of South America has been in sharp focus for investors all year. They have flocked to the region as part of a broader migration into emerging market debt, following record low valuations and the hunt for yield in a low interest rate environment. While investors have been presented with a rarely seen buying opportunity in emerging markets like South America, it is a mistake to regard these countries as a homogenous group. That leaves the challenge of working out which are the most attractive opportunities some of our best known investments were not obvious choices. We have devised a formula to help us evaluate the fundamental strength of different emerging market countries. It scores a countrys current and projected strength on five factors: how well it has learnt the lessons from past crises; the quality of its policy mix; the structural reform being undertaken to boost productivity; the level of domestic demand; and its ability to resist external shocks. The aim is to pick nations that are fundamentally strong but, for one reason or another, are out of favour with investors. It can take time for the market to catch up to reality. But if you are a long-term investor and we are certainly in that camp you have the luxury of being able to wait. Brazil, for example, is known as a vulnerable market due to the commodities downturn, the ongoing corruption crisis and ensuing political turmoil, but our work suggests to us that it is poised for a potentially significant rebound in the long term. Its current score is low, but its projected future score tells a different story. We believe the country has learnt the lessons from the most recent crisis, which brought home the importance of having a sustainable fiscal policy. It has already adopted a flexible exchange rate, has strong foreign exchange reserves and has limited short-term debt. This is also reflected in the countrys improving resilience to external shocks, with a reliance on commodities, at 60 per cent of exports, being the largest remaining negative. It is perhaps no surprise, given Brazils deep recession and political instability, that there is much work required in terms of improving policy mix, making structural reforms and boosting domestic demand. However, there are signs things are being turned around, with monetary policy already being tightened aggressively to bring inflation expectations back under control, and the previously excessive levels of government subsidised lending being cut. Once political stability returns, the government will be empowered to do even more. Work on structural reform should accelerate too, as Brazils middle class has made it clear it wants greater transparency and an economic policy framework that can both boost living standards and improve the environment for businesses. (www.ft.com. 01.09.2016. Adaptado) In the excerpt of the first paragraph Whileinvestors have been presented with a rarely seen buying opportunity in emerging markets like South America, it is a mistake to regard these countries as a homogenous group, the word in bold can be correctly replaced by

(FGV -2015) Argentina defaults Eighth time unlucky Cristina Fernndez argues that her countrys latest default is different. She is missing the point. Aug 2nd 2014 ARGENTINAS first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001. Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentinas president, Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is Americas courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These hold-outs, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to 1freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up. Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are vultures as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default. Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; 2had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentinas government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism. Ms Fernndez is right that the consequences of Americas court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But 3hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimize the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment. Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles. More important, it would help to change 4perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernndez seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentinas image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This weeks events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone elses, 5Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs. (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted) The excerpt from the reference 2 had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. denotes an idea of

(FGV - 2014) Read the article and answer question(s). The road to hell (1) Bringing crops from one of the futuristic new farms in Brazils central and northern plains to foreign markets means taking a journey back in time. Loaded onto lorries, most are driven almost 2,000km south on narrow, potholed roads to the ports of Santos and Paranagu. In the 19th and early 20th centuries they were used to bring in immigrants and ship out the coffee grown in the fertile states of So Paulo and Paran, but now they are overwhelmed. Thanks to a record harvest this year, Brazil became the worlds largest soya producer, overtaking the United States. The queue of lorries waiting to enter Santos sometimes stretched to 40km. (2) No part of that journey makes sense. Brazil has too few crop silos, so lorries are used for storage as well as transport, causing a crush at ports after harvest. Produce from so far north should probably not be travelling to southern ports at all. Freight by road costs twice as much as by rail and four times as much as by water. Brazilian farmers pay 25% or more of the value of their soya to bring it to port; their competitors in Iowa just 9%. The bottleneck at ports pushes costs higher still. It also puts off customers. In March Sunrise Group, Chinas biggest soya trader, cancelled an order for 2m tonnes of Brazilian soya after repeated delays. (3) All of Brazils infrastructure is decrepit. The World Economic Forum ranks it at 114th out of 148 countries. After a spate of railway-building at the turn of the 20th century, and road- and dam-building 50 years later, little was added or even maintained. In the 1980s infrastructure was a casualty of slowing growth and spiralling inflation. Unable to find jobs, engineers emigrated or retrained. Government stopped planning for the long term. According to Contas Abertas, a public-spending watchdog, only a fifth of federal money budgeted for urban transport in the past decade was actually spent. Just 1.5% of Brazils GDP goes on infrastructure investment from all sources, both public and private. The long-run global average is 3.8%. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates the total value of Brazils infrastructure at 16% of GDP. Other big economies average 71%. To catch up, Brazil would have to triple its annual infrastructure spending for the next 20 years. (4) Moreover, it may be getting poor value from what little it does invest because so much goes on the wrong things. A cumbersome environmental-licensing process pushes up costs and causes delays. Expensive studies are required before construction on big projects can start and then again at various stages along the way and at the end. Farmers and manufacturers spend heavily on lorries because road transport is their only option. But that is working around the problem, not solving it. (5) In the 1990s Mr Cardosos government privatized state-owned oil, energy and telecoms firms. It allowed private operators to lease terminals in public ports and to build their own new ports. Imports were booming as the economy opened up, so container terminals were a priority. The one at the public port in Bahias capital, Salvador, is an example of the transformation wrought by private money and management. Its customers used to rate it Brazils worst port, with a draft too shallow for big ships and a quay so short that even smaller vessels had to unload a bit at a time. But in the past decade its operator, Wilson Sons, spent 260m reais on replacing equipment, lengthening the quay and deepening the draft. Capacity has doubled. Land access will improve, too, once an almost finished expressway opens. Paranagu is spending 400m reais from its own revenues on replacing outdated equipment, but without private money it cannot expand enough to end the queues to dock. It has drawn up detailed plans to build a new terminal and two new quays, and identified 20 dockside areas that could be leased to new operators, which would bring in 1.6 billion reais of private investment. All that is missing is the federal governments permission. It hopes to get it next year, but there is no guarantee. (6) Firms that want to build their own infrastructure, such as mining companies, which need dedicated railways and ports, can generally build at will in Brazil, though they still face the hassle of environmental licensing. If the government wants to hand a project to the private sector it will hold an auction, granting the concession to the highest bidder, or sometimes the applicant who promises the lowest user charges. But since Lula came to power in 2003 there have been few infrastructure auctions of any kind. In recent years, under heavy lobbying from public ports, the ports regulator stopped granting operating licences to private ports except those intended mainly for the owners own cargo. As a result, during a decade in which Brazil became a commodity-exporting powerhouse, its bulk-cargo terminals hardly expanded at all. (7) At first Lulas government planned to upgrade Brazils infrastructure without private help. In 2007 the president announced a collection of long-mooted public construction projects, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). Many were intended to give farming and mining regions access to alternative ports. But the results have been disappointing. Two-thirds of the biggest projects are late and over budget. The trans-north-eastern railway is only half-built and its cost has doubled. The route of the east-west integration railway, which would cross Bahia, has still not been settled. The northern stretch of the BR-163, a trunk road built in the 1970s, was waiting so long to be paved that locals started calling it the endless road. Most of it is still waiting. (8) What has got things moving is the prospect of disgrace during the forthcoming big sporting events. Brazils terrible airports will be the first thing most foreign football fans see when they arrive for next years World Cup. Infraero, the state-owned company that runs them, was meant to be getting them ready for the extra traffic, but it is a byword for incompetence. Between 2007 and 2010 it managed to spend just 800m of the 3 billion reais it was supposed to invest. In desperation, the government last year leased three of the biggest airports to private operators. (9) That seemed to break a bigger logjam. First more airport auctions were mooted; then, some months later, Ms Rousseff announced that 7,500km of toll roads and 10,000km of railways were to be auctioned too. Earlier this year she picked the biggest fight of her presidency, pushing a ports bill through Congress against lobbying from powerful vested interests. The new law enables private ports once again to handle third-party cargo and allows them to hire their own staff, rather than having to use casual labour from the dockworkers unions that have a monopoly in public ports. Ms Rousseff also promised to auction some entirely new projects and to re-tender around 150 contracts in public terminals whose concessions had expired. (10) Would-be investors in port projects are hanging back because of the high chances of cost overruns and long delays. Two newly built private terminals at Santos that together cost more than 4 billion reais illustrate the risks. Both took years to get off the ground and years more to build. Both were finished earlier this year but remained idle for months. Brasil Terminal Porturio, a private terminal within the public port, is still waiting for the government to dredge its access channel. At Embraport, which is outside the public-port area, union members from Santos blocked road access and boarded any ships that tried to dock. Rather than enforcing the law that allows such terminals to use their own workers, the government summoned the management to Braslia for some arm-twisting. In August Embraport agreed to take the union members on a trial basis. (11) Given such regulatory and execution risks, there are unlikely to be many takers for either rail or port projects as currently conceived, says Bruno Savaris, an infrastructure analyst at Credit Suisse. He predicts that at most a third of the planned investments will be auctioned in the next three years: airports, a few simple port projects and the best toll roads. That is far short of what Brazil needs. The good news, says Mr Savaris, is that the government is at last beginning to understand that it must either reduce the risks for private investors or raise their returns. Private know-how and money will be vital to get Brazil moving again. (www.economist.com/news/special-report. Adapted) In the sentence fragment from the last paragraph it must either reduce the risks for private investors or raise their returns the use of either ... or indicates an idea of

(FGV -2010) Petrobras approves first offshore heavy oil development Petrobras has approved the development project for its Siri field in the Campos basin, according to a news report from Brazil. The field will be the first in the world ________ extra heavy oil from an offshore site. Siri field, off the coast of Southeast Brazil, _________ in production tests since March and the company plans to contract production equipment in 2011. www.ogfj.com Assinale a alternativa que completa, correta e respectivamente, a primeira lacuna no texto.

(FGV - 2010) Brazil is More Than Soccer and Carnival July 24, 2009 Many investors rarely think about Brazil as a place to put their investment dollars. They think Brazil is just a country that goes crazy over soccer and has a wild Carnival every year in Rio. But Brazil is so much more. They may have the best economy in the Americas. Brazil has made great strides under current President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, commonly known as Lula. Lula took office on January 1, 2003 and he has, since being in office, run a very orthodox fiscal policy. The country has maintained fiscal and trade surpluses for the better part of his presidency. Brazils highly capable Central Bank has followed a very strong monetary policy. They have maintained high levels of real interest rates, which prevented the economy from overheating and creating an over-expansion of credit unlike the policies of others like the Federal Reserve. In late April, the Brazilian Central Bank cut their interest rate from 11.25% to 10.25%. This leaves them plenty of room to cut interest rates further, if necessary, to stimulate the Brazilian economy. Again, this distinguishes the Brazilian Central Bank from the Federal Reserve and others, who have left themselves virtually no room to cut interest rates further. Also, Brazil has long pursued a strategy of achieving energy independence from foreign oil. Brazil started its own ethanol program based on its rich sugar crop and offshore oil exploration using deep-sea drilling methods. Its achieved a remarkable degree of energy self-sufficiency again setting it apart from much of the rest of the world. Brazil, unlike the United States and other economies, is not over-levered It has prudent fiscal and monetary policies, balanced and diversified trade, along with a coherent energy policy. It leaves the country well positioned for the future. www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/3370044#. Adaptado No trecho do quinto pargrafo do texto Its achieved a remarkable degree of energy self-sufficiency... o s em Its pode ser corretamente substitudo por:

(FGV - 2009) UN STUDY FINDS BRAZILS WORKING CONDITIONS UNSATISFACTORY September 9, 2008 A UN study released Monday pointed out that Brazils current working conditions remain poor, though the country 1_________a significant improvement in the past decade. According to the study, Brazil witnessed economic growth at the beginning of the decade 2_______ led to an increasing number of available jobs and a growth of workers average incomes. But the study also finds that wage differences between men and women, blacks and non-blacks are still high. In 2006, the average income of non-black women in Brazil was 524.6 reais (327.8 U.S. dollars), while that of black women was 367.2 reais (229.5 dollars). The average income of black men in 2006 was 451.1 reais (281.9 dollars), while that of non-black men was 724.4 reais (452.75 dollars). In addition, Brazilians aged between 16 and 24 face 3________ difficulties in finding a job than any other age group, the study finds. The study also shows that there are still 2.4 million children and teenager (aged 5-15) laborers in Brazil, 4________the number fell by 50 percent from 1992 to 2006. (news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/09/content_9867753.htm. Adaptado) Assinale a alternativa que complete a lacuna 3.

(Fgv 2008) Most of their criticism stems from the Hyde Act, passed last year by American lawmakers to allow nuclear trade with India. It contains a nonbinding clause directing the U.S. president to determine whether India is cooperating with American efforts to confront Iran about its nuclear program. That has been seized on by Indian critics as proof that Washington intends to direct New Delhis foreign policy. (Doubts grow over U.S. - India nuclear deal - By MATTHEW ROSENBERG) According to the text, the Hyde Act:

(Fgv 2007) The great mystery about these copycat cars is their price. Chinese counterfeiters obviously save on research and development costs, but they still have to buy steel and other materials at market prices. Most of them make cars in very small volumes, so there are no economies of scale. That they can sell these cars for half the price of the originals suggests that something odd is going on. They either do not know their own costs (a distinct possibility), have revolutionized car making (highly unlikely) or are being subsidized in some way. For the time being, no one knows. Counterfeit cars in China - The sincerest form of flattery SHANGHAI The Economist - Apr 4th 2007 According to the text:

(Fgv 2007) Just as Lula has won over the traders, so the São Paulo exchange, known as Bovespa, has calmed the doubts of international investors in recent years. Long buffeted by rampant inflation, soaring interest rates and extreme volatility, share prices on Latin Americas largest stock market have doubled in the past three years, according to the leading market index. Brazils stock Exchange - A second look - SÃO PAULO The Economist - Apr 4th 2007 According to the text:

(FGV -1995) BLACK NIGERIANS X EUROPEANS I studied at a European university ___(1)___ for the past 20 years, black Nigerian students have, on average ___(2)___ consistently better academically than ___(3)___ white European classmates. ___(4)___ we conclude from this, in line with the opinions of some scholars, that black Nigerians are genetically more intelligent than Europeans? Assinale, a letra correspondente alternativa que preenche corretamente a lacuna 4 do texto.

(Fgv 1995) The idea that executives need to fly on business class...(1)... they can work is bogus, according to a survey of European business travelers conducted ...(2)... the Official Airline Guides. It ...(3)... that passengers pounding laptops were most likely to be sitting in economy class. The more senior the ...(4)... executive, likely you are to find them relaxing in business class ...(5)... a movie, the OAG says. Assinale a alternativa que preenche corretamente a lacuna 5 do texto